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HOW CAN UKRAINE BREAK OUT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL TRAP?1 
  
Ineffective institutional equilibrium exacerbated by the February 2014 revolution and the 
Russian aggression brought Ukraine to the state of near systemic collapse. With the existing set 
of leaders and institutions Ukraine could hardly reform itself. In order to survive, Ukraine needs 
stronger ties to the Western institution than current EU-Ukraine's Association Agreement could 
provide. 
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Мацієвський Ю.В. 
ЯК УКРАЇНІ ВИСЛИЗНУТИ З ІНСТИТУЦІЙНОЇ ПАСТКИ? 
 
Неефективна інституційна рівновага (інституційна пастка) сформувалася в Україні ще у 
90-их рр. ХХ ст. У цих умовах революція 2014 р. і російська агресія штовхнули країну до стану 
майже системного краху. З чинною сукупністю еліт та інституцій, Україна навряд чи 
зможе реформувати себе сама. Для того щоб вижити, Україні потрібні тісніші зв’язки з 
Західними інститутами, ніж ті, які передбачені Угодою про Асоціацію з ЄС. 
Ключові слова: інституційна пастка, системна уразливість, гібридний режим, Україна, 
ЄС, США. 
 
Мациевский Ю.В. 
КАК УКРАИНЕ ВЫЙТИ ИЗ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ЛОВУШКИ? 
 
Неэффективное институциональное равновесие (институциональная ловушка) 
сформировалось в Украине еще в 90-ых гг. ХХ в. В этих условиях революция 2014 г. и 
российская агрессия толкнули страну к состоянию почти системного краха. С 
существующей совокупностью элит и институтов, Украина вряд ли сможет 
реформировать себя сама. Для того чтобы выжить Украине нужны белее тесные связи с 
западными институтами, чем те, которые предусмотрены Соглашением об Ассоциации с 
ЕС. 
Ключевые слова: институциональная ловушка, системная уязвимость, гибридный 
режим, Украина, ЕС, США. 
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Although elections and two mass protests (of 
2004 and 2014) brought about changes of 
people in power, the essence of the Ukrainian 
regime remains unchanged. Beginning in mid 
90th Ukraine’s Freedom House 
democratization index has always been within 
the range of one point (4.00 – 4.97, measured 
on the scale from 1 to 7), which corresponds 
to the «transitional government or hybrid 
regime» category. While Baltic and East 
European states democratized and most of 
Eurasian sates digressed to authoritarianism, 
Ukraine appears to be at the crossroads again. 
Most Ukrainians, a large part of Ukraine’s 
elite and many in the West want it to join the 
club of democracies. On the other side, 
however, are Ukrainian populists, rent-seekers 
and aggressive Putin’s regime. Which side 
prevails, depends not only on Ukraine, but 
also on the will of external players.  
One way to explain the Ukraine’s impasse 
with reforms is to apply the concept of 
institutional trap [1]. Institutional trap is a set 
of inefficient yet stable institutions that none 
of the major players is interested to change. In 
case of Ukraine, informal deals, clientelism 
and corruption prevented elites from 
developing shared rules of the game. The 
precedence of «political expediency» over the 
formal decision-making procedures has led to 
the systematic violation of the rule of law. The 
decline of the rule of law contributed to the 
inefficient institutional equilibrium in which 
informal rules set the trend behavior for 
political players. Once established (in the mid 
1990s) this set of institutions inhibited the 
growth of a full-fledged market, functional 
democracy, effective sate and integrated 
nation. Incomplete reforms in each of these 
areas indicate that Ukraine faces a syndrome 
of problems that reinforce each other. In other 
words, Ukraine founds itself in systemic 
institutional trap [2]. 
 
Ukraine facing the systemic vulnerability. 
It has been almost three years since the 2014 
revolution brought another set of leaders into 
power. The new president and the parliament 
declared encompassing reform program, 
however, as the implementation is slowing 
down, the confidence in the new leadership is 
melting away [3]. What are the chances that 
Ukraine succeeds in moving forward and what 
are the potential threats? 
It is well documented in the developmental 
literature that the change of the country’s 
trajectory could occur in result of severe 
internal or external shock, when the ruling 
group is facing the threat of losing power or 
even physical existence. The theory of 
«systemic vulnerability» posits that 
«developmental states will only emerge when 
political leaders […] simultaneously staring 
down the barrels of three different guns: (1) 
the credible threat that any deterioration in the 
living standards of popular sectors could 
trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the 
heightened need for foreign exchange and war 
materiel induced by national insecurity; and 
(3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a 
scarcity of easy revenue sources» [4, p. 328]. 
Unless political leaders are confronted by 
all three constraints at the same time, they 
could find a way to stay in power without 
major institutional upgrade. Thought the 
theory was developed on the examples of 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, it makes 
sense for the post-Soviet states as well.  
Unfinished revolution, Russian aggression 
and deep economic decline indicate that since 
the end of 2013 Ukrainian leaders have been 
facing all three conditions of «systemic 
vulnerability». The experience of the three 
South Asian states, the Baltic States and 
especially Georgia suggests that under similar 
constraints elite should initiate the total reset 
of the system. Though Ukrainian leaders 
began an ambitious reform program the 
question, however, remains whether this 
attempt succeeds or repeats the fate of partial 
reforms. 
 
Missing links: effective state and 
bureaucracy.  
A closer look at the situation in Ukraine and 
the elite’s inconsistent response to the 
«systemic vulnerability» suggest that the 
requisite condition of development – effective 
institutions are currently missing in Ukraine. 
Above all, these are modern state and rational, 
in Weber's sense bureaucracy. During the first 
decade of independence, Ukraine has evolved 
from a quasi-state into the quasi-modern state 
[5, pp. 80-111]. Predatory elite’s behavior, 
most visible under Yanukovych, has not 
strengthened, but strangled the state. Of the 
six Weberian components of bureaucratic 
(rational) state organization [6, pp. 269-272], 
Ukraine has only three: written guidelines 
prescribing performance criteria, division of 
labor and authority, and hierarchical 
organization. Three others, however, those 
forming the basis – compliance with the 
formal rules, meritocracy and salary based 
compensation exist only on paper. A number 
of contradictory internal instructions make the 
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compliance with rules hardly possible. The 
principle of merit based selection is subverted 
by quota based clientelistic appointments [7]. 
Low wages in the civil service are 
compensated by the «corruption tax». By and 
large the high degree of personalization of 
Ukrainian politics makes it distant from the 
rational bureaucratic model. Thus «captured» 
by several clans and completely seized by the 
Yanukovych's «family» the state lost the 
monopoly on violence and control over the 
territory after the government had changed in 
February 2014. 
 
From vulnerability to near systemic 
collapse.  
The «systemic vulnerability» theory posits 
that the acute geopolitical and fiscal 
constraints urge the elite to create a «broad 
coalition». «Broad coalitions are best 
constructed and sustained with side payments 
to popular sectors; but the provision of such 
payments is rendered difficult by security 
threats, which siphon revenues into the 
defense sector, and by resource limitations, 
which impose hard budget constraints. 
Systemic vulnerability, thus makes the 
reconciliation of coalitional, geopolitical, and 
fiscal constraints a matter of ruling elites' 
political survival» [4, p. 331].  
Sustaining broad coalition requires the 
ability to export high value-added goods, what 
is impossible without major institutional 
upgrade. But the upgrade requires viable 
institutional base and this is what Ukraine 
lacks the most. Under current constraints the 
very first challenge for politicians and society 
is to restore the administrative capacity of the 
state without increasing the president's 
powers. Numerous studies demonstrate that 
strong presidencies have a negative impact on 
economic growth and consequentially 
democratization. Though imperfect the dual 
executive system in Ukraine proves more 
conductive for political openness and 
competition than the single executive system.  
Building a broad coalition in practical 
terms means opening access to economic and 
political activities. Establishing the rule of 
law, curbing corruption, creating a business-
friendly environment as well as succeeding in 
forming fair electoral, public prosecution and 
court system had to be the first step towards 
bridging the gap between the government and 
society. 
Under virtually non-existent state the 
reaction of Ukrainian elites to the challenges 
of «systemic vulnerability» was twofold. First, 
they choose to rely on narrow instead of 
building a broad coalition, and second they 
sought to adapt to the external players. The 
result was deepening the gap between the 
government and society and the complete loss 
of initiative in countering Russian aggression. 
The absence of the viable institutional base as 
well as dependence on external players – two 
variables that currently set Ukraine apart from 
the above mentioned states. 
Though the West is interested in solving 
«the Ukraine crisis», both the U.S. and the EU 
still look at Ukraine as the instrument in 
developing their new Russian policies. No 
wonder that after Ukrainian authorities put the 
question of Ukraine’s survival onto the 
Western shoulders, the West (and Russia) 
demanded concessions in implementing Minsk 
II agreements (e.i. granting the Donbas a 
special status in Ukraine’s constitution). 
Meanwhile the effectiveness of the parliament 
in developing the legislative base for reforms 
remains poor. This implies that the Ukrainian 
leaders are trying to solve the question of 
political survival by relying on the narrow 
coalition and by adapting to the external 
players.  
This analysis offers three preliminary 
conclusions. First, the changes within the 
system, at least in the short run, do not 
necessarily lead to a change of the system. 
Even experiencing acute coalitional, fiscal and 
geopolitical constraints the Ukrainian leaders 
have chosen adapting the system to internal 
and external pressures (by announcing 
reforms) but not resetting it. The reset would 
be possible if Ukraine has had viable 
institutions in place (the state and 
bureaucracy) and the revolution produced a 
genuine renewal of the elite. Currently, both 
conditions are absent. Though the new 
government is the youngest of all existing 
governments and the parliament was renewed 
by more than 60 percent, the president and the 
prime-minister are both counting on the old 
practices (informal deals and cleintelism) and 
people (oligarchs). Thus, to expect the current 
government to succeed in implementing 
reforms would be naïve. Some reforms, like 
creating a patrol police, have been 
successfully started, but it is doubtful it will be 
implemented in full. Partial reforms have 
never led to the change of the system. As the 
Soviet case inform, partial reforms contributed 
to the decline of the old system and to its 
subsequent collapse.  
Second, from the broader perspective 
Ukraine is experiencing three processes: 
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unfinished revolution, a decline of the weak 
post-soviet state, and the birth of a political 
nation. The February 2014 revolution is 
unfinished as the new leadership is poorly 
delivering (justice is not restored, living 
conditions are worsening, war is not 
terminated). Revolution and the Russian 
aggression precipitated the decline of the 
quasi-modern state, but stimulated the national 
integrity and civic activism. While the state is 
sick, the society is well and alive [8, p. 27]. 
This leads to the third conclusion. With the 
existing set of leaders and institutions Ukraine 
cannot reform itself. The real driver of reforms 
is civil society, but the civic activist cannot 
implement reform. They can pressure for and 
control of the government who is in charge for 
implementing reforms. In order to start 
moving forward Ukraine needs stronger ties to 
the viable institutions and structures that under 
current constraints only the West can provide. 
But the West is facing a dilemma: it wants to 
freeze the conflict in the Donbas and it wants 
to see Ukraine becoming a normal country. 
Reaching the first goal may contradict with 
reaching the second one. Partial support, like 
partial reforms brings poor results. If the 
current approach to Ukraine prevails, the 
conflict will sooner or later be frozen and 
Ukraine be kept afloat, meaning it will be 
partially reformed, but still hybrid. 
Considering the weak support for authorities 
and the growing frustration from the 
ineffective reform strategy, the process, 
however, may slip out of control and Ukraine 
could embark into the new wave of chaos. In 
order to prevent this scenario and help the 
Ukrainian society to reset the system the US 
and the EU must anchor Ukraine to its 
institutions and structures. 
 
What can the West do?  
Having committed a series of mistakes in 
relations with Yanukovych and Putin, the 
West, particularly the EU should act in concert 
in several directions. 
1. Adopting a new Eastern Partnership 
policy (EaP) with countries that have signed 
association agreements (AA) and deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements 
(DCFTA) with the EU is an urgent task [9]. 
DFCTA is not enough as its implementation 
was already compromised under the Russian 
pressure. It is now critical to make no more 
delays with coming it into the effect.  
Anchoring Ukraine to the European 
institutions can solve three problems: reform, 
democracy and peace. This is what the 
Western strategic interest is in Ukraine. 
Currently, this view is not shared by all 
Western politicians and experts, but it is up to 
all those wishing Ukraine a success that this 
view prevails.  
2. Considering the strained EU’s situation, 
provoked by ‘Brexit’ and by the migration 
crisis, it would be naïve to expect any 
breakthrough in promising a membership 
perspective to the EaP countries. The former 
conditionality policy is no longer relevant as 
well, at least in relation to Ukraine, whereas 
the former is facing the existential threat from 
Russia. Now Ukraine alone is paying the 
highest prize for countering Russian 
aggression. If Ukraine fails, the cost of 
responding to both hard and soft security 
threats to the West will rise dramatically. Sure 
enough, the latest challenges within the EU 
will hardly bring the issue of the EU 
enlargement back on the table in the next 
decade. The EU should develop a clear policy 
toward Ukraine, focusing on curbing 
corruption, governance and institution 
building [10]. Building on the emerging 
allegiance to European values in Ukraine the 
EU must utilize its ‘Transformative power’ to 
help Ukraine becoming a modern state. The 
success in reforming Ukraine can attract 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into the 
country [11]. The prospects of FDI inflow will 
press the Ukrainian authorities to reduce the 
state interference into the businesses of 
enterprises and make the property rights more 
secure. This, in turn, as A. Aslund argues, 
could allow Ukraine to become a part of the 
European supply chain and stimulate 
economic growth [12, p. 50].  
3. To recognize that the real driving force 
of reform in Ukraine is not the government, 
but the public. Hence, there is a need for a 
comprehensive support of Ukrainian civil 
society in developing, promoting and 
implementing reforms. The formula should be: 
«Double support for the grassroots initiatives 
and a double pressure on the Ukrainian 
authorities in the process of reforms 
implementation». 
4. The US, the IMF and the EU must 
develop a rescue plan for Ukraine. This plan 
should abandon «more for more» approach 
and prioritize long term institution building 
over short term financial stabilization. Though 
Ukraine has restructured its debt to private 
owners by $15 bln. for the next four years, it 
needs a long term grants program instead of 
new loans.  
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5. To abandon the instrumental view of 
Ukraine in relations with Russia. The Russian 
aggression in Ukraine has been typically 
called «the Ukraine crisis», though without 
direct interference and covert Russian 
operations in Eastern Ukraine the war on the 
Ukraine’s east would be hardly possible. Since 
the beginning of the war, the West has worked 
on «freezing» it by being primarily concerned 
with the Russia's reaction. The Western part of 
the signatories of the Budapest memorandum 
(The U.S., U.K. and France) failed to provide 
any evident 'security assurances' to Ukraine 
and failed to recognize Russia a party to the 
conflict in Ukraine. The result was traumatic 
to Ukraine as it had to accept asymmetric 
concessions to Russia. 
6. Considering the possible reproaching of 
the Trump’s administration with Russia the 
West (primarily the EU) has to uphold a 
uniform position in maintaining Russia’s 
sanctions and to prevent the split in this 
question. Easing the sanctions may ignite a 
new wave of Putin's adventurism that will 
ultimately destroy the postwar international 
order.  
7. Finally, the US – Ukraine strategic 
partnership should be filled with appropriate 
substance. Most part of the US congress and 
many experts [13] are calling for new bilateral 
engagement with Ukraine. This engagement 
should not be based on promoting any 
particular leader/s or party, but on advancing 
good solutions to Ukraine’s problems. In this 
regard the US (and EU) should engage with 
Ukrainian civil society to make its voice 
supported and heard by Ukrainian authorities.  
Institutional «binding» of Ukraine to the 
West will fill the institutional vacuum, 
enhance the normative power of the 
constitution and thus, strengthen the 
administrative capacity of Ukrainian state. 
Elites survival in this case will be insured by 
the fulfillment of agreements and by 
compliance with the rules of the democratic 
political game. The rule of law will be, thus, 
strengthened what facilitates the transition 
from state of hybridity to the path of 
sustainable development. If the West, 
however, continues to consider Ukraine as a 
tool in containing Russia, the conflict in the 
East will sooner or later be frozen, Ukraine 
will be kept «alive», but remain in under 
modernized state. The only source of change 
in this case will be the society again. 
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